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ABSTRACT
When building cryptosystems, cryptographers focus on finding problems that are not believed
to be solvable in polynomial-time. Some of the most popular problems they have found are the
Discrete Logarithm Problem and Integer Factoring. The former is used in Diffie-Hellman Key
Exachange (DHK) and El Gamal encryption, while the latter is used in RSA. El Gamal and DHK
are both very popular, but RSA is more prevalent due to its efficiency. Nevertheless, it is plausible
that in the next few decades, all three of these systems will likely be useless due to the advances
made by Peter Shor in quantum computing.
This paper will explain the details of how Shor’s algorithm works and how it accomplishes the
above. It will also feature a redesign of the proof of Jeffrey Miller (1975) that efficiently reduces
from order finding in a group of order N to factoring N . Hopefully, doing so will aid future
students in their studies of quantum algorithms and Post-Quantum Cryptography.
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NOMENCLATURE
BQP Bounded-Error Quantum Polynomial Time
lg lg(x) = log2(x) =
QFT Quantum Fourier Transform
FFT Fast Fourier Transform
gcd(x, y) Greatest Common Divisor of x and y
Fp The field containing {1, 2, . . . p}
Z/〈N〉 The ring of integers mod N
U∗ The complex-conjugate transpose of the matrix U
dxe The smallest integer greater than x
|x| The order of x in a given group
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
NOMENCLATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
1. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Cryptography Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Overview of RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Overview of El Gamal and Diffie-Hellman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Motivation for Studying Shor’s Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.5 Overview of how Shor’s Algorithm Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. REDUCTION FROM FINDING THE ORDER OF AN ARBITRARY GROUP ELE-
MENT TO FACTORING AN INTEGER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Order-Finding Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Polynomial Reduction From Order-Finding to Integer Factoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. CLASSICAL COMPUTING VS. QUANTUM COMPUTING AND THE MATH IN-
VOLVED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1 Differences Between Classical and Quantum Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2 How to Visualize and Understand Qubits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. PHASE ESTIMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1 The Problem for Phase Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2 Solving Phase Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. QUANTUM FOURIER TRANSFORM .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
vii
5.1 Deriving and Developing Definitions of the QFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2 Making Use of the QFT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6. MODULAR EXPONENTIATION AND CONTINUED FRACTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1 What Happened in Register 2 of Phase Estimation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.2 Why is the Eigenvalue of the U in Phase Estimation Important? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.3 Continued Fractions Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.1 Layout of the Entire Algorithm for Integer Factoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.2 Verifying Membership in BQP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE Page
3.1 Representation of a qubit on the Bloch Sphere adapted from [6] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1 Phase Estimation Circuit Model adapted from [6] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1 Quantum Fourier Transform on 3 qubits adapted from [6] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.2 Quantum Fourier Transform on n qubits adapted from [6] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
ix
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Cryptography Overview
Whenever we use messaging services (email, text, etc.), banking services, or anything that deals
with transferring information that we don’t want to be public, we are using some sort of cryptosys-
tem. These cryptosystems are made by cryptographers, and they use an encryption protocol that is
appropriate for the information being shared. This means that the system must be fast enough for
the users; i.e., we don’t want to wait 10 minutes for our phones to encrypt a text message before
it sends. It also means that the system must be secure enough to deal with the anticipated attack.
For example, in cabinets we probably store something like basic foods, whereas in a fire safe we’re
going to store something like private documents (passport, social security card, etc.). We’re not
too concerned about someone breaking into our home just to steal the food, but we are concerned
about the documents being stolen. Thus, we build fire safes more securely than cabinets.
When we make cryptosystems to protect information, we are generally basing the cryptosys-
tems off of the fact that it’s “hard” to solve some given problem. For our most secure systems we
are going to choose problems that (hopefully) require exponential time to solve. Unfortunately,
efficient cryptosystems that are provably this hard to break remain unknown. What is currently
known is how to build useful cryptosystems whose breakage implies the resolution of well-known
computational problems expected to be algorithmically hard in practice. In order to show these
things and verify that the cryptosystem is being based on an appropriate problem, we need a fun-
damental understanding of complexity theory, abstract algebra, and number theory. Despite that,
it’s been shown that cryptography has been around since approximately 1900 BC. However, a new
and potentially dangerous sub-field, quantum cryptography, arose in 1970. The danger comes from
the potential to break current cryptosystems that are secure enough to be used by the NSA, FBI,
DEA, etc.
My interest lies in the field of post-quantum cryptography which is the study of cryptography
with the assumption that we have a stable quantum computer that can run quantum algorithms.
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Fortunately for us, it’s estimated that we still have 25-100 years before such a computer can be
made which gives us time to study post-quantum cryptography and come up with alternatives to
our current cryptosystems. One can get away without knowing the quantum mechanics that lie
behind the quantum computer, but a decent knowledge of computer science is certainly needed
for post-quantum cryptography. One side of post-quantum cryptography is aimed at proposing a
method of encryption that can’t possibly be cracked by classical or quantum computers. The other
side is to take problems from current cryptosystems and prove that they belong to the complexity
class BQP . BQP , Bounded-Error Quantum Polynomial Time, is the complexity class of decision
problems that can be solved with a correct answer at least 2/3 of the time. The latter is the side that
I’m interested in, more specifically I’m interested in how we break famous cryptosystems such as
RSA and how we create cryptosystems that are quantum-resistant. The following will give us an
official definition to prove that Integer Factoring is indeed in BQP .
Definition 1. BQP is the class of decision problems for which there exists a uniform family of
polynomial-size quantum circuits that can be solved with a correct answer greater than 2/3 of the
times the problem is attempted.
1.2 Overview of RSA
RSA is a cryptosystem made by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman that assumes that factoring
an arbitrary integer is considered to be hard, classically. In outline we have two people, Alice and
Bob, who are trying to communicate without their adversary, Eve, getting in the way. Alice secretly
chooses two prime numbers, p and q. She then publishes n = p·q and r such that gcd(r, φ(n)) = 1
where φ is Euler’s Totient function. Bob then chooses a message M such that 1 ≤ M < n and
checks that gcd(M,n) = 1. Bob then computes C ≡ M r (mod n) and sends C to Alice. Alice
can then find s such that r · s ≡ 1 (mod φ(n)) and then use that to compute Cs ≡ M mod (n).
In order to recover the message, Eve needs to find φ(n) which means that she needs to be able
to factor n. Even our best algorithms (Elliptic Curve method, Quadratic Sieve, etc.) are unable
to factor a general integer faster than eO((log(N))1/3(log(log(N)))2/3) by [5]. This is good because that
running time is exponential and thus doesn’t put integer factoring in P . This means that it’s safe
2
for our government and our servers to continue using RSA encryption.
1.3 Overview of El Gamal and Diffie-Hellman
There is another type of encryption known as El Gamal which is based off the Diffie-Hellman
Key-Exchange Protocol which relies on the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) being hard. For
DLP, we are trying to find x such that gx ≡ b (mod n) when given g, b, and n. We can apply this
to an Alice, Bob, and Eve situation as follows. First, Alice chooses a prime p that is large enough
that it’s unfeasible to solve DLP in Fp. Alice will secretly select a private key, a and compute
A ≡ ga (mod p) where g ∈ Fp. Bob will now need to send a message, m ∈ Z, to Alice where
2 ≤ m < p. In order to encrypt m, Bob computes b1 ≡ gk (mod p) and b2 ≡ mAk (mod p)
where k is a randomly selected element of Fp. He will then send b1 and b2 to Alice and she will
compute (ba1)
−1 · b2 (mod p) in order to get m. A huge downside here is that we are using 2-1
encryption. This means that our cipher-text has to be twice as long as our original message. Due
to ease of use and speed, we primarily use RSA to encrypt information. There are various types of
RSA, with the most secure version being RSA-2048 which uses numbers that are 2048 bits long
(617 decimal digits).
1.4 Motivation for Studying Shor’s Algorithm
In 1994 Dr. Peter Shor released his algorithm [7] for factoring a general integer with
O((log(n))2(log(log(n)))(log(log(log(n))))) quantum gates. This put integer factoring in the
complexity class of BQP and thus implied that we would be able to break RSA with a “good”
quantum computer. By “good” quantum computer, we are talking about a quantum computer that
is stable enough to run Shor’s Algorithm and also utilizes over 4000 qubits. While experts predict
that we are still 25-100 years from having such a quantum computer, it’s still intimidating to think
that our most effective method of encryption will be broken. Bernstein, Mosca, and others have
made advances on Shor’s Algorithm by decreasing the number of qubits which weakens the time
complexity slightly. So it’s reasonable that we could have access to a similar algorithm that will
allow us to break RSA sooner than we expect.
3
1.5 Overview of how Shor’s Algorithm Works
The quantum algorithm developed by Shor doesn’t actually focus on factoring a number. In-
stead, it focuses on putting the order-finding problem in BQP . This is done by utilizing phase
estimation along with the quantum fourier transform and then applying some number-theoretical
results about modular exponentiation, continued fractions, and rational numbers. Then with a
polynomial reduction from order-finding to integer factoring, given by Dr. Jeffrey Miller in 1975,
we get that integer factoring is also in BQP . We’ll proceed with a description of the polynomial
reduction first.
4
2. REDUCTION FROM FINDING THE ORDER OF AN ARBITRARY GROUP ELEMENT
TO FACTORING AN INTEGER
2.1 Order-Finding Problem
Before starting, we should note that (Z/〈N〉) is the multiplicative group of all integers less than
N that are co-prime to N , i.e., Z∗8 = {1, 3, 5, 7}. The Order-Finding problem is the following: Let
N ∈ N and x ∈ (Z/〈N〉). Can we find the minimal r ∈ N such that xr ≡ 1 (mod N)? Since N
is the number that we wish to factor later on, we will also add on the constraint that N is odd and
composite. we makeN composite because if we were trying to factor a number, we would first use
the AKS primality test to determine whether N is prime or not in polynomial time. If it is, then we
have the factorization of N and the problem is trivial. We choose N to be odd, because if N were
even, then N
2k
is odd for some k ∈ N, and the problem reduces to factoring N
2k
. It’s also safe to say
that N is not a perfect square because this would also make our factoring problem trivial since we
can find the square root of number in polynomial time with Newton’s Method. we can now tighten
the bounds on x by saying that 2 < x < N − 1 because of the new constraints on N .
2.2 Polynomial Reduction From Order-Finding to Integer Factoring
So now our goal is to try to get a non-trivial factor of N with success greater than 2/3 of the
time and the assumption that we know the order of x. The following theorem will give us a way of
finding such a factor and then we can calculate the probability of the setting of the theorem actually
happening.
Theorem 1. Let x ∈ (Z/〈N〉) such that |x| = r, xr/2 6≡ −1 (mod N), and r is even. Then
gcd(xr/2 − 1, N) gives a non-trivial factor of N in polynomial time.
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Proof.
r is even and |x| = r =⇒ xr ≡ 1 (mod N)
=⇒ xr − 1 ≡ 0 (mod N)
=⇒ (xr/2 + 1)(xr/2 − 1) ≡ 0 (mod N)
Now suppose that gcd(xr/2 − 1, N) gives a trivial divisor of N .
Case 1: Suppose gcd(xr/2 − 1, N) = N . Then N | xr/2 − 1 =⇒ xr/2 − 1 ≡ 0 (mod N)
which contradicts r being the order of x. Thus, gcd(xr/2 + 1, N) 6= N .
Case 2: Suppose gcd(xr/2 − 1, N) = 1. Then xr/2 − 1 ≡ 1 (mod N) =⇒ N | xr/2 + 1 =⇒
xr/2+1 ≡ 0 (mod N). However, this contradicts xr/2 6≡ −1 (mod N). Thus, gcd(xr/2−1, N) 6=
1.
In either case, gcd(xr/2 − 1, N) gives a non-trivial divisor of N . The Euclidean Algorithm can
then be used to calculate the gcd in polynomial time.
Before we find the probability of r being even and xr/2 6≡ −1 (mod N), we’ll need two
lemmas. Beforehand, it’s important to note that, by the Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic, N
has a unique prime factorization, i.e. N = pα11 · . . . · pαmm where every pi is prime and m is
the number of distinct prime factors of N . For notational purposes in the following lemmas, let
rj = |xj| and dj be the largest integer such that 2dj |rj . Similarly d is the largest integer such that
2d|r.
Lemma 1. Let x ∈ (Z/〈N〉) such that |x| = r. If r is odd or xr/2 ≡ −1 (mod N), then dj = c
for some c ∈ Z and for all j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
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Proof. We know that every rj | r because
xr ≡ 1 (mod N)
≡ 1
(
mod
(
m∏
j=1
p
αj
j
))
≡ 1 (mod (pαjj )) for all j ∈ Zm \ {0}
Case 1: Suppose r is odd. Since we must have rj|r for all j ∈ Zm \ {0} we also must have that
every rj is odd. Therefore dj = 0 = d for all j ∈ Zm \ {0}.
Case 2: Suppose r is even and xr/2 ≡ −1 (mod N). Similar to case 1, we get that xr/2 ≡
−1 (mod pαjj ) for all j ∈ Zm \ {0} which means that rj doesn’t divide r2 for every j ∈ Zm \ {0}.
Claim: All of the dj’s are equal to each other.
Proof of Claim: Suppose not. Then ∃ distinct i, j ∈ Zm \ {0} such that i 6= j and di 6= dj .
WLOG suppose di < dj . We know that rj | r and ri | r by Lagrange’s Theorem. We know that
rj = 2
djqj for some odd, positive integer qj , and ri = 2diqi for some odd, positive integer qi. Since
rj | r and ri | r, we have that r = 2djqjkj for some kj ∈ Z and r = 2diqiki for some ki ∈ Z. Thus,
2dj | r and qi | r. Since qi is odd, we must have that 2dj and qi are co-prime. Therefore,
2djqi | r =⇒ 2dj−di+diqi | r
=⇒ 2dj−di2diqi | r
=⇒ 2dj−diri | r
=⇒ ri | r
2
which is a contradiction.
Therefore, di = dj for all i, j ∈ Zm \ {0}. Since they are all equal we also have that di = d for all
i ∈ Zm \ {0}.
Lemma 2. Let p be an odd prime and h is the largest power of 2 that divides φ(pα) where φ is the
Euler φ function. Then with probability 1
2
, 2h divides the order, y, modulo pα of a random x ∈ Z∗pα .
Proof. Let x ∈ Z∗pα . As a property of the Euler φ function, we know that φ(pα) = pα−1 · (p −
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1). Since p is odd we know that φ(pα) is even which means that h ≥ 1. Z∗pα is cyclic under
multiplication so x = gk (mod pα) where g is a generator of Z∗pα and k ∈ [0, φ(pα)] ∩ Z .
Case 1: Suppose k is odd. Then we have
xy = 1 (mod pα) =⇒ gky = 1 (mod pα)
=⇒ φ(pα) | ky
=⇒ 2h | ky
=⇒ 2h | y, since k is odd
Case 2: Suppose k is even. Then x = gk (mod φ(pα)) =⇒ xφ(pα)/2 (mod (φ(pα)) =
1 (mod φ(pα)). This means that y | φ(pα)/2. Since h is the largest integer such that 2h | φ(pα) we
know that 2h doesn’t divide φ(pα)/2. Therefore 2h doesn’t divide y.
Since the probability of k ∈ [0, φ(pα)] ∩ Z being odd is 1
2
, we have that the probability of 2h
dividing y is 1
2
.
Theorem 2. Let x ∈ (Z/〈N〉) such that |x| = r. Then the probability that r is even and xr/2 6≡
−1 (mod N) is greater than or equal to 1− 2−m where N = pα11 · . . . · pαmm .
Proof. PROB(r is even and xr/2 6≡ −1 (mod N)) = 1−PROB(r is odd or xr/2 = −1 (mod N))
so it suffices to prove that PROB(r is odd or xr/2 = −1 (mod N)) = 2−m. By Lemma 1, we
know that these conditions can only be met if all of the dj’s are equal to d. The probability of this
happening for just one of the dj’s is at most 12 by Lemma 2.
Therefore PROB(r is odd or xr/2 = −1 (mod N)) ≤ 2−m =⇒ PROB(r is even and xr/2 6≡
−1 (mod N)) ≥ 1− 2−m.
Now we have shown that given the order of an arbitrary element in a group of order N , we
can get a non-trivial factor of N with at least 3/4 chance of being correct. We have at least a 75%
chance because N is a composite number that is not a perfect square, so it must have at least two
different prime factors. Thus, m ≥ 2 so 1 − 2−m ≥ 3
4
. This means that if the Order-Finding
problem is in BQP , then so is integer factoring. Before showing how to place the Order-Finding
8
problem in BQP , we’ll first take a look at some of the rudimentary concepts associated with the
mathematics of quantum computing.
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3. CLASSICAL COMPUTING VS. QUANTUM COMPUTING AND THE MATH
INVOLVED
3.1 Differences Between Classical and Quantum Computing
Suppose we have a number N ∈ N. We can represent N in binary notation as N is an element
of {0, 1}k where k = blg(N) + 1c (the number of bits required to represent N in binary notation
without a sign bit). This representation is independent of whether we are using a classical or
quantum computer. In both scenarios we have registers that store these bits/qubits. The differences
between classical and quantum computing come from how these registers act when measured and
how the bits/qubits work. These differences also help us to understand why we are so interested in
the complexity class BQP when it comes to quantum computing.
When representing N in classical computing, what we really have is a register that contains
k flip flops. You can think of some sequence x1x2 . . . xk where all of the xj’s are light switches.
When we turn a light switch on we get a 1 for the xj and when we turn a light switch off we get a
0 for the xj . Anybody who has ever tried to play with a normal light switch in their house, would
know that the light switch can’t be off and on at the same time. Thus, we can only represent one
number at a time with this sequence of xj’s. The upside is that we can flip light switches on and off
while observing the different light settings without destroying anything. In the language of clas-
sical computing, this means that we can measure our register with a non-destructive measurement
so that we can continue using that register later on if need be.
In quantum computing our register, |Ψk〉, is made up of k qubits. A huge upshot for quantum
computing is that |Ψk〉 doesn’t just represent one number. Instead, it represents every number
y ∈ Z such that 0 ≤ y ≤ 2k − 1 (we can represent negative numbers and rational numbers as well
by using the same methods that classical computing uses). We do this by putting each qubit into a
superposition of states that will give us some number with high probability when we perform our
measurements. However when we perform this measurement we use “destructive” measurement.
This prevents us from accessing a lot of information from the register.
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Example of destructive measurement: Suppose we have a 2 qubit register
|Ψ2〉 = |a〉 |b〉 such that |a〉 = a1 |0〉 + a2 |1〉 and |b〉 = b1 |0〉 + b2 |1〉 where a1, a2, b1, b2 ∈ C.
Every qubit must have a norm of 1, i.e. |a1|2 + |a2|2 = |b1|2 + |b2|2 = 1. The multiplication
of |a〉 and |b〉 is just the tensor product of their respective vectors, i.e. |a〉 |b〉 = a1b1 |00〉 +
a1b2 |01〉+ a2b1 |10〉+ a2b2 |11〉. Now suppose we measure |a〉 and we get |a〉 = 1. Now we have
|a〉 |b〉 = a2b1 |10〉+ a2b2 |11〉. However, this will not satisfy the norm requirement unless a1 = 0.
This means that we are most likely changing our coefficients to get |a〉 |b〉 = a′2b′1 |10〉+ a′2b′2 |11〉
to satisfy the norm requirement.
3.2 How to Visualize and Understand Qubits
The superposition of a quantum state is represented as
|Ψ〉 = α0 |0〉+ α1 |1〉 =
α0
0
+
 0
α1

The coefficients of the computational bases, namely α0 and α1, represent the up-spin and down-
spin of a particle respectively. The only criteria on the coefficients are that they are complex
numbers with modulus (distance from (0, 0) ∈ C) no greater than 1 and that the sum of the squares
of their moduli is equal to 1.
One way of visualizing this is by using the Bloch Sphere from [6]. In order to do this we will
see that every |Ψ〉 can be written as below, simply by factoring out the phase of α0.
|Ψ〉 = cos
(
θ
2
)
|0〉+ eiφ sin
(
θ
2
)
|1〉
The following shows that this is an acceptable definition by the criteria of the coefficients:
Criterion 1: Clearly the coefficients are complex numbers. The image of the cosine function
gives us that | cos ( θ
2
) | ≤ 1. To find the modulus of the second coefficient we have
|eiφ sin ( θ
2
) | = |eiφ| · | sin( θ
2
)| = (cos2(φ) + sin2(φ)) · | sin( θ
2
)| = sin( θ
2
) ≤ 1 by the image of the
sine function.
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Criterion 2: The sum of the squares of their moduli is given by
∣∣∣∣cos(θ2
)∣∣∣∣2+∣∣∣∣eiφ sin(θ2
)∣∣∣∣2 = ∣∣∣∣cos(θ2
)∣∣∣∣2+(∣∣eiφ∣∣ · ∣∣∣∣sin(θ2
)∣∣∣∣)2 = cos2(θ2
)
+sin2
(
θ
2
)
= 1
Now if we take (x, y, z) = (sin(θ) cos(φ), sin(θ) cos(φ), cos(θ)) then we get a point on the unit
sphere where the closer we are to the north or south pole, the higher probability we have of mea-
suring a 0 or 1 respectively. This can all be seen in the following picture:
Figure 3.1: Representation of a qubit on the Bloch Sphere adapted from [6]
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4. PHASE ESTIMATION
4.1 The Problem for Phase Estimation
The motivation for the following is that if we can place the phase estimation problem in BQP
then we can place the order-finding problem in BQP . Phase Estimation is a quantum procedure
to finding the eigenvalue of a given unitary operator U and a given eigenvector |ψ〉. Since a
unitary operation preserves the norm of a vector, the corresponding eigenvalue of U is just an
exponential complex function with real value φ such that 0 ≤ φ < 1. Thus we can state the
problem we are trying to solve as follows: Given a unitary operator U and it’s eigenvector |ψ〉, find
an arbitrarily close estimation for φ such that 0 ≤ φ < 1 and U |ψ〉 = e2piiφ |ψ〉. Now note that
e2piiφ = cos(2piφ) + i sin(2piφ) =⇒ φ ∈ [0, 1). We can write the binary approximation of φ as
φ˜ = 0.φ1φ2 . . . φt =
φ1
2
+ φ2
22
+ . . .+ φt
2t
where the size of t is dependent on how close we want the
approximation to be, how many qubits our quantum computer can use, and the range of error that
we want (this will be explained later when we analyze phase estimation procedure). Note that if
φ = φ˜ for some t then φ is called a Dyadic number.
4.2 Solving Phase Estimation
It’s important to note that the following is not an actual quantum algorithm. That is, phase
estimation relies on the fact that we have “black-boxes” (also known as oracles) that are capable
of presenting us with |ψ〉 and U . That being said, we will refer to phase estimation as a procedure
for how to solve for φ, given the above-mentioned black-boxes. We start with two registers named
R1 and R2. In R1 we will have t qubits that are set equal to |0〉. We will refer to these qubits as
|xi〉 such that 1 ≤ i ≤ t. In R2 we will store |ψ〉 and apply controlled-U operations. R2 will not be
important in the sense that we will never measure it. Afterwards, we apply the circuit model given
on the next page.
13
|0〉 H
|0〉 H
|0〉 H
|0〉 H
1√
2
(
|0〉+ e2pii(2t−1φ˜)|1〉
)
1√
2
(
|0〉+ e2pii(22φ˜)|1〉
)
1√
2
(
|0〉+ e2pii(21φ˜)|1〉
)
1√
2
(
|0〉+ e2pii(20φ˜)|1〉
)
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·|ψ〉 |ψ〉U20 U21 U22 U2t−1
First register
t qubits
Second register
...
...
Figure 4.1: Phase Estimation Circuit Model adapted from [6]
In the above circuit model we have H , the Hadamard gate, is the quantum gate with matrix
representation given by H = 1√
2
1 1
1 −1
. The Hadamard gate just takes a qubit and puts it into
superposition with an equal chance of measuring 0 or 1. We can verify that the Hadamard gate is
indeed a unitary operator by making quick use of the following theorem.
Proposition 1. Let U be a matrix of size n× n where the rows of U are denoted u1, u2, . . . , un. If
every pair of distinct row vectors is orthogonal and ~ui ·~ui = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then U is unitary.
Going forward, when a matrix is stated to be “clearly unitary”, it is because a quick computation
via Theorem 3 will show that it is indeed unitary. Now as much as we would love to just state that a
the multiplication of a unitary matrix with a suitable vector preserves the norm of the vector, such
a statement requires proof. In the proof we’ll use the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let U be a n× n matrix and v be a column vector in Cn. Then (Uv)∗ = v∗U∗.
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Proof. Let uij denote the entries in U , ui denote the i-th row of U and let vi denote the entries of v.
Note that ui is equal to the row vector ui where we have taken the complex conjugate of each entry.
Uv =

u1 · v
u2 · v
...
un · v

=⇒ (Uv)∗ =
[
u1 · v u2 · v . . . un · v
]
v∗U∗ =
[
u1 · v u2 · v . . . un · v
]
= (Uv)∗
Corrolary 1. Let U be a n × n unitary matrix and v be a row-vector in Cn. Then Uv preserves
the norm of v, that is, ‖v‖ = ‖Uv‖
Now going back to the circuit model for phase estimation, we can see how the controlled-U
gates work. The black dots in the circuit model represent which qubit is being acted on by each
controlled-U gate. Essentially if a qubit is in the state |0〉 then nothing will happen, but if a qubit
is in the state |1〉 then we will adjust the coefficient of the qubit. Since we still have to satisfy the
norm requirements for a quantum state, we are just changing the phase of qubit, i.e. changing the
exponent in the coefficient e2pii. We can now represent the first register as
|R1〉 =
t−1⊗
k=0
1√
2
(
|0〉+ e2pii2kφ˜ |1〉
)
= 1
2t/2
2t−1∑
k=0
e2kpiiφ˜ |k〉
Using the binary approximation of φ˜ from 4.1, we can substitute for φ˜ to get
|R1〉 = 12t/2
2t−1∑
k=0
e2kpii[.φ1φ2...φt] |k〉 (4.1)
An important thing to note is that we only used O(t) gates in register 1 of the phase estimation
circuit model (we’ll talk about register 2 later). This is key because it fits with our definition of
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BQP (it also fits the probability of error part of the definition which will be explained later). Next
we’ll take a look at the Quantum Fourier Transform (QFT) to show how to obtain φ˜ from |R1〉.
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5. QUANTUM FOURIER TRANSFORM
5.1 Deriving and Developing Definitions of the QFT
For those who are already familiar with Fourier Transforms such as the Discrete Fourier Trans-
form (DFT) you may think of the QFT as the quantum analogue of DFT−1. For others, we’ll define
the QFT in multiple ways below. As always, in quantum computing we should check that the QFT
is a unitary operator before we do anything with it. To do so, it’s best to start with the following
definition.
Definition 2. Let |Xn〉 be a register consisting of n qubits denoted by x1, x2, . . . , xn. Then the
matrix representation of the QFT acting on |Xn〉 is given by
QFT(|Xn〉) = 1√2n

1 1 1 . . . 1
1 e
2pii
2n e
4pii
2n . . . e
2(2n−1)pii
2n
1 e
4pii
2n e
8pii
2n . . . e
4(2n−1)pii
2n
...
...
... . . .
...
1 e
2(2n−1)pii
2n e
4(2n−1)pii
2n . . . e
2(2n−1)2)pii
2n

If we want the QFT to act on a single basis state given by |x1x2 . . . xn〉 then we can look at the
entries of the i-th row, where i = xn + 2xn−1 + . . . 2n−1x1, to get the coefficients of x1, x2, . . . xn.
For example, let’s look at the QFT acting on a register of 3 qubits. The corresponding matrix
would be given by
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1
2
√
2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1+i√
2
i −1+i√
2
−1 −1−i√
2
−i 1−i√
2
1 i −1 −i 1 i −1 −i
1 −1+i√
2
−i 1+i√
2
−1 1−i√
2
i −1−i√
2
1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1
1 −1−i√
2
i 1−i√
2
−1 1+i√
2
−i −1+i√
2
1 −i −1 i 1 −i −1 i
1 1−i√
2
−i −1−i√
2
−1 −1+i√
2
i 1+i√
2

From this we can gather that
QFT(|100〉) = 1
2
√
2
(|000〉 − |001〉+ |010〉 − |011〉+ |100〉 − |101〉+ |110〉 − |111〉)
We can also develop a circuit model for the QFT acting on 3 qubits, which can be seen below.
|x1〉 1√2
(|0〉+ e2pii[0.x1x2x3] |1〉)
|x2〉 1√2
(|0〉+ e2pii[0.x2x3] |1〉)
|x3〉 1√2
(|0〉+ e2pii[0.x3] |1〉)
H R2 R3
H R2
H
Figure 5.1: Quantum Fourier Transform on 3 qubits adapted from [6]
In the above circuit model we have the Hadamard gate once again showing up and then the
Rk’s are called controlled-phase gates where Rk =
1 0
0 epii2
−k+1
. Once again, the black dots
represent the Rk gate acting on the bit on the corresponding line. If the bit is equal to |0〉 then
nothing happens and if it’s in state |1〉 then we change the phase by a factor of pii2−k+1. Now
we want to try to develop the tensor product equation and the summation equation for n qubits
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so that we can transfer that into a circuit model for n qubits. Once we do that we will notice a
very shocking relation between our circuit model for phase estimation and our circuit model for
the QFT. The derivation of the tensor product and summation equation can be seen as following
by starting with the map given by the matrix in definition 2.
QFT(|Xn〉) = 1√
2n
(|0〉+ e2pii[.xn] |1〉) (|0〉+ e2pii[.xn−1xn] |1〉) · · · (|0〉+ e2pii[.x1x2···xn] |1〉)
=
1√
2n
n⊗
j=1
(|0〉+ e2pii[.xjxj+1···xn])
=
1√
2n
n⊗
j=1
 1∑
kj=0
e2piiXnkj2
−j |kj〉

=
1√
2n
1∑
k1=0
· · ·
1∑
kn=0
n⊗
j=1
e2piiXnkj2
−j |kj〉
=
1√
2n
1∑
k1=0
· · ·
1∑
kn=0
e
2piiXn
(
n∑
j=1
kj2
−j
)
|k1k2 · · · kj〉
=
1√
2n
2n−1∑
k=0
e2piiXnk2
−n |k〉 note that |k〉 should be written using binary notation
The tensor product equation is what we use to get our circuit model, but the summation equation
will be restated as another definition of the QFT for computational purposes.
Definition 3. Let Xn be a positive integer written in binary notation with n qubits, denoted by
x1, x2, . . . xn in order from left to right. Then QFT(Xn) = 1√2n
2n−1∑
k=0
e2piiXnk2
−n |k〉. Note this is
equivalent to Definition 2 and the following circuit model.
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|x1〉
|x2〉
|x3〉
|xn−1〉
|xn〉
1√
2
(|0〉+ e2pii[0.x1...xn] |1〉)
1√
2
(|0〉+ e2pii[0.x2...xn] |1〉)
1√
2
(|0〉+ e2pii[0.x3...xn] |1〉)
1√
2
(|0〉+ e2pii[0.xn−1xn] |1〉)
1√
2
(|0〉+ e2pii[0.xn] |1〉)
H R2 R3 ·· Rn
H R2
H R2
H
Figure 5.2: Quantum Fourier Transform on n qubits adapted from [6]
5.2 Making Use of the QFT
Now suppose we wanted make use of awful notation and instead of using Xn and xj’s for the
QFT, we chose to use φ˜n and φ˜j’s for the QFT. We would then see that if we perform a bit reversal
after letting the QFT act on φn, we would indeed end up with the exact same output as the phase
estimation circuit model. Since the QFT is clearly a unitary operator, we know that QFT−1 exists
and is a unitary operator as well. Thus, we take our output for the phase estimation model, act on
it with the QFT−1, and perform a measurement to retrieve φ˜ (the estimate for the eigenvalue of the
unitary operator we were given). Suppose our acceptable range of error from φ is 2−n, i.e. we want
φ− φ˜ ≤ 2−n. It turns out that if we take t = n+dlog(2+ 1
2ε
)e then we can get a successful estimate
of φ with probability at least 1− ε. Since we are going to be acting on the phase estimation circuit
model, we should note that we will have t qubits in the QFT−1. Thus we will have t Hadamard
gates, t − 1 R2 gates, t − 2 R3 gates, . . . , and 1 Rt gate. So in total we will have O(t2) = O(n2)
gates for the QFT−1. Note that we’re not including the bit reversal in this because the amount of
gates needed for that is negligible in comparison.
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6. MODULAR EXPONENTIATION AND CONTINUED FRACTIONS
6.1 What Happened in Register 2 of Phase Estimation
In order to discuss what happened in register 2 of phase estimation, we’ll take another look at
the circuit model for phase estimation.
|0〉 H
|0〉 H
|0〉 H
|0〉 H
1√
2
(
|0〉+ e2pii(2t−1φ˜)|1〉
)
1√
2
(
|0〉+ e2pii(22φ˜)|1〉
)
1√
2
(
|0〉+ e2pii(21φ˜)|1〉
)
1√
2
(
|0〉+ e2pii(20φ˜)|1〉
)
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·|ψ〉 |ψ〉U20 U21 U22 U2t−1
First register
t qubits
Second register
...
...
Again let |R1〉 denote the contents of the first register. Then the purpose of the controlled-U
operations is to take the state |R1〉 |ψ〉 to the state |R1〉
∣∣xR1ψ mod (N)〉. So, essentially, we just
want to multiply the second register |ψ〉 by xR1 mod (N). So if we can find the number of gates
it takes to compute xR1 mod (N), then we can combine the number of gates from the first register
to find out how many gates are actually used in Phase Estimation. Note that the following can be
improved drastically, but since our only concern is placing integer factoring in BQP , we’re only
concerned with making sure that we have a family of polynomial size circuits. Remember that we
are using t qubits in |R1〉 where t = n + dlog(2 + 12ε)e. We can compute xR1 mod (N) with
O(n) squaring operations if we use repeated squaring. Each of these squaring operations will have
a cost of O(n2) if we use the grade-school multiplication algorithm. Thus, we will not need any
more than O(n3) gates to compute xR1 mod (N). Combining this with the number of gates from
the first register, we get that phase estimation only requires O(n3) gates.
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6.2 Why is the Eigenvalue of the U in Phase Estimation Important?
To recap what has been performed so far, we have used a black-box and the phase estimation
circuit to set up the phase estimation problem. Afterwards we applied a bit reversal to the QFT and
then computed the QFT−1 of the output of the phase estimation circuit. The output of all of this is
φ˜ which is our t qubit approximation of the original eigenvalue φ. Remember the whole point of
this was to get the order of an arbitrary element of (Z/〈N〉) with high probability so that we could
apply our polynomial reduction. It turns out that if we just apply the continued fractions algorithm
to φ˜ then we will do exactly that.
6.3 Continued Fractions Algorithm
Before we apply such an algorithm to φ˜, we need to verify that there is a finite continued
fraction for φ˜. Remember, φ˜ = [.φ1φ2 . . . φt] = φ12 +
φ2
4
+ . . . φt
2t
. Therefore φ˜ is a finite sum of
rational numbers so φ˜ is a rational number. With the following theorem we will verify that φ˜ has
a finite continued fraction representation which means that the algorithm will terminate. However,
since there are multiple ways to represent continued fractions, we’ll make use of the following
definition.
Definition 4. A continued fraction for a number x is given by [x0, x1, x2, . . . , xn] such that
x = [x0, x1, x2, . . . , xn] = x0 +
1
x1+
1
x2+
1
...+ 1xn
Theorem 3. Every x ∈ Q has a finite continued fraction representation.
Proof. Since x ∈ Q we can write x = a
b
such that a, b ∈ Z, b 6= 0, and a
b
is already reduced into
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its lowest terms. By the Euclidean algorithm we can write
a = x1b+ r1 s.t. 0 ≤ r1 ≤ b− 1; (6.1)
b = x2r1 + r2 s.t. 0 ≤ r2 ≤ r1 − 1; (6.2)
r1 = x3r2 + r3 s.t. 0 ≤ r3 ≤ r2 − 1; (6.3)
... (6.4)
rn−2 = xnrn−1 (6.5)
Dividing by the quotients in each step of the Euclidean algorithm will give us
a
b
= x1 +
r1
b
(6.6)
b
r1
= x2 +
r2
r1
(6.7)
r1
r2
= x3 +
r3
r2
(6.8)
... (6.9)
rn−2
rn−1
= xn (6.10)
If we back-substitute (6.10) into (6.9), (6.9) into (6.8), . . . , and (6.7) into (6.6) we will get
a
b
= x1 +
1
x2+
1
x3+
1
...+ 1
xn−1+ 1xn
Therefore, x must have a finite continued fraction representation since the Euclidean Algorithm
must terminate in n steps for some n ∈ N.
It’s extremely important to note that this part of Shor’s Algorithm is done classically because
there is no extreme advantage from using a quantum computer at this time. We know that we can
run the Euclidean algorithm in polynomial time so we must be able to find the continued fraction
representation of φ˜ in polynomial time (specifically we can do it with O(n3) gates where n was
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our range of error on φ). Now we’ll rewrite φ˜ = a
b
such that a, b ∈ Z and b 6= 0, since φ˜ a
rational number. We made a
b
such that φ − a
b
≤ 2−n so we have a convergent of the continued
fraction of φ by Theorem 171 in [1]. The only way that b doesn’t give us the order of an element
is if we had some error in phase estimation or if a and b are not co-prime. For the first scenario
remember that we can choose ε so that our chance of failure in phase estimation is suitable. For
the second scenario, note that a < b and the number of prime numbers less than b is greater than
b
2 log(b)
. Therefore, the probability that a is co-prime to b is greater than 1
2 log(b)
which is greater than
1
2 log(N)
. So if we repeat the algorithm 2 log(N) times we will have a suitable chance at obtaining
a and b such that gcd(a, b) = 1.
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Layout of the Entire Algorithm for Integer Factoring
The algorithm for integer factoring can be stated as follows:
Input: N such that N ∈ N, N = 2k + 1 for some k ∈ N, and N has at least 2 distinct prime
factors.
Output: p such that p is a non-trivial factor of N
Number of Gates Needed: O(n3) gates are needed where n is given by the range of error allowed
on φ˜ during phase estimation
Procedure:
1. Randomly choose x ∈ Z∗N . If gcd(x,N) 6= 1, then return x.
2. Create two quantum registers |R1〉 = |0〉 and |R2〉 = |1〉 so that our quantum system is
represented by |0〉 |1〉
3. Create a superposition in the first register using a Hadamard gate on each qubit for
t = n + dlog(2 + 1
2ε
)e qubits. This gives us |R1〉 = 1√2t
2t−1∑
j=0
|j〉. So our quantum system is
represented by 1√
2t
2t−1∑
j=0
|j〉 |1〉
4. Utilize a black-box and modular exponentiation on the second register to transform it into
|R2〉 = |xj mod (N)〉. So our quantum system is represented by 1√2t
2t−1∑
j=0
|j〉 |xj mod (N)〉.
5. Utilize a bit reversal, the QFT−1, and then a measurement to obtain φ˜
6. Apply the continued fraction algorithm
7. Let b be the order (denominator) from the continued fraction algorithm.
If xb/2 = −1 mod (N) or b is even then restart the algorithm by choosing x′ from Z∗N \{x};
Else, return gcd(xr/2 − 1, N) to retrieve the non-trivial factor of N .
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7.2 Verifying Membership in BQP
Recall that we only used O(n3) gates in phase estimation and O(n2) gates in the QFT (so
similarly we use O(n2) gates in the QFT−1. So for steps 1 through 5 of our integer factoring
algorithm, we have satisfied the gate requirement of BQP . For steps 6 and 7 we note that both of
these can be completed in polynomial time via the euclidean algorithm so they will not affect the
algorithm’s membership in BQP . The only thing left to verify is that we can achieve a successful
output with greater than 2/3 success. We can choose our chance of error for phase estimation so
that part is negligible. Similarly we can run the algorithm iteratively for the continued fraction
portion so we can keep our success above 2/3. As far as the polynomial reduction is concerned
we know that the probability of success there is greater than 3/4. Thus we have shown that with a
polynomial family of gates we can achieve a non-trivial factor of N with probability of error less
than or equal to 1
3
.
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